- 作 者：田国强著
- 出 版 社：北京：北京大学出版社
- 出版年份：2000
- ISBN：7301045689
- 注意：在使用云解压之前，请认真核对实际PDF页数与内容!
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前言 1
Acknowledgments 1
PartⅠ Nash Implementation of Lindahl and Walrasian Allocations 3
1.Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued,Feasible,and Continuous Mechanism,Review of Economic Studies,56:613-621,1989 3
2.Completely Feasible and Continuous Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with a Message Space Minimal Dimension,Journal of Economic Theory,51:443-452,1990 12
3.Implementation of Lindahl Allocations with Nontotal-Nontransitive Preferences,Journal of Public Economics,46:247-259,1991 22
4.Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence without Continuous,Convex,and Ordered Preferences,Social Choice and Welfare,9:117-130,1992 35
5.Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism,Journal of Mathematical Economics,22:169-179,1993 49
6.Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies (with Qi Li and S.Nakamura),International Economic Review,36:37-52,1995 60
7.On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding (With Qi Li),Games and Economic Behavior,9:222-233,1995 76
PartⅡ Implementable State and Mixed Ownership Systems 91
8.Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations,Journal of Economic Theory,64:568-584,1994 91
9.An Implementable State-Ownership System with General Variable Returns (with Qi Li),Journal of Economic Theory,64:286-297,1994 108
10.Ratio-Lindahl Equilibria and an Informationally Efficient and Implementable Mixed-Ownership System(with Qi Li),Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,26:391-411,1995 120
11.Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational-Expectations Lindahl Allocations,Games and Economic Behavior,16:135-151,1996 143
PartⅢ Bayesian Implementation 143
12.Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State Dependent Preferences and Feasible Sets,Social Choice and Welfare,16:99-119,1999 160
13.Virtual Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments with Infinite Alternatives and Types, Journal of Mathematical Economics,28:313-339,1997 181
PartⅣ Existence of Optimal Truth-Dominant Mechanisms 211
14.On the Existence of Optimal Truth-Dominant Mechanisms,Economics Letters,53:17-24,1996 211
15.A Characterization of the Existence of Optimal Dominant Strategy Mechanisms(with Liqun Liu),Review of Economic Design,4:205-218,1999 219
PartⅤ Double Implementation in Nash and Strong Nash Equilibria 235
16.Double Implementation in Economies with Production Technologies Unknown to the Designer,Economic Theory,13:689-707,1999 235
17.Double Implementation of Lindahl Allocations by a Pure Mechanism,Social Choice and Welfare,17:125-141,2000 254
18.Implementation of Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Solution Nash and Strong Nash Equilibria 271
19.Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships 295
20.Double Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations 323
PartⅥ Informational and Efficiency of Mechanisms 343
21.On Informational Efficiency and Incentive Aspects of Generalized Ratio Equilibria,Journal of Mathematical Economics,23:323-337,1994 343
22.On Uniqueness of Informational Efficiency of the Competitive Mechanism in Production Economies 358