- 作 者：EUGENE M.SINGER
- 出 版 社：INC
- 出版年份：2222
- ISBN：
- 标注页数：226 页
- PDF页数：238 页
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1. ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMIC MODELS 1
Classical Economic Models in Antitrust 2
The Inadequacies of the Model of Pure Competition for Antitrust Policy 3
Conclusion 8
Endnotes 8
Thought Questions 9
2. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 11
The Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC) 12
Reclassification of Product Categories Over Time 15
Selection of a Sample of Industries 17
Concentration Trends 18
Selection of a Concentration Index 21
Conclusion 25
Endnotes 25
Thought Questions 26
3. PROFITS 29
Questions the Alleged Relationship Between Profits, Concentration and Monopoly Power 29
Inadequacies of Average Profit as a Performance Standard 30
The Statistical Significance of the Alleged Relationship Between Profits and Concentration 31
Conclusion 32
Endnotes 32
Thought Questions 32
4. INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST CASES 39
Monopoly 39
Price Fixing 41
Vertical Integration 42
Price Discrimination 43
Mergers 43
5. MONOPOLY CASES 47
The Standard Oil Case (1911) 47
Endnotes 50
Thought Questions 51
The Alcoa Case (1945) 54
United Shoe Machinery Case (1953) 58
Endnotes 59
Thought Questions 60
The Berkey Photo-Kodak Case (1978) 66
Thought Questions 68
The FTC ReaLemon Opinion (1978) 69
Endnotes 73
Thought Questions 73
The Memorex-IBM Case (1978) 74
Endnotes 80
Thought Questions 80
6. PRICE FIXING CASES 83
Introduction on Proof of Conspiracy 83
Direct Price Fixing Agreements 84
Price Reporting Plans 85
Endnotes 89
Thought Questions 90
7. VERTICAL INTEGRATION CASES 93
The Foreclosure of Suppliers 93
The "Squeezing" of Independent Fabricators 95
The Squeezing Dilemma 97
The Total Squeeze 98
Business Reciprocity 99
Territorial Restrictions on Dealers 101
Endnotes 103
Thought Questions 103
8. TYING ARRANGEMENTS 105
Economic Rationale for Tying Arrangement 105
The Per Se Rule for Tying Arrangements 109
Endnotes 115
9. ROBINSON-PATMAN CASES 119
Price Discrimination Under Section 2 (a) 119
The Meeting Competition Defense Under Section 2 (b) 123
Knowingly Inducing and Receiving Discriminatory Prices Under Section 2 (f) 125
Endnotes 127
Thought Questions 128
10. MERGER CASES 131
A. Determination of the Relevant Market 131
Endnotes 139
Thought Questions 140
B. Relative Concentration in Merger Cases 141
Endnotes 147
Thought Questions 148
C. Conglomerate Mergers 149
Endnotes 156
Thought Questions 156
D. Product Extension Mergers 157
Thought Questions 160
E. Horizontal Mergers Between A Leading Company and a Weak Competitor 160
Conclusion 165
Thought Questions 166
APPENDICES 167
A: Antitrust Law of the United States 169
B: Theoretical Comparison of the Models of Pure Competition and Pure Monopoly 175
C: Oligopoly Models 189
D: Economic Theory of Vertical Integration 211
E: Some Thoughts on the Calculation of Treble Damages 217
INDEX BY SUBJECT 227