- 作 者：（法）让·雅克·拉丰（Jean-Jacques Laffont）著
- 出 版 社：北京：北京大学出版社
- 出版年份：2001
- ISBN：7301050771
- 标注页数：757 页
- PDF页数：773 页
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Part Ⅰ General Equilibrium and Incentives 3
1.On Moral Hazard in General Equilibrium Theory(with E.HELPMAN),Journal of Economic Theory,10:8-23,1975. 3
2.Optimism and Experts against Adverse Selection in a Competitive Economy,Journal of Economic Theory,10:284-308,1975. 19
3.Courts against Moral Hazard,Journal of Mathematical Economics,3:269-283,1976. 44
4.Taxing Price Makers(with R.GUESNERIE),Journal of Economic Theory,19:423-455,1978. 59
5.On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information,Econometrica,53:1-29,1985. 92
Part Ⅱ Foundations of Incentive Theory à propos the Free Rider Problem 123
6.Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods(with J.GREEN),Econometrica,45:427-438,1977. 123
7.Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem(with J.GREEN and E.KOHLBERG),Journal of Public Economics,6:375-394,1976. 135
8.A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms(with E.MASKIN),is Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences,J.J.Laffont ed.,North-Holland,289-308,1979. 155
9.A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms(with E.MASKIN),Econometrica,48:1507-1520,1980. 175
10.Nash and Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments(with E.MASKIN),Journal of Mathematical Economics,10:17-47,1982. 189
11.On the Robustness of Strategy Proof Mechanisms(with R.GUESNERIE),Journal of Mathematical Economics,10:5-15,1982. 220
12.The Theory of Incentives:An Overview(with E.MASKIN),in Advances in Econom ic Theory,W.Hildenbrand ed.,Cambridge University Press,Ch.2,31-94,1982. 231
Part Ⅲ Advanced Topics in Incentive Theory 297
13.Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design(with J.GREEN),Review of Economic Studies,53:447-456,1986. 297
14.Incentive Theory with Data Compression(with J.GREEN),in Volume in Honor of K.ARROW,W.Heller,R.Starr,and D.Starrett,eds.,Cambridge University Press,Ch.10,239-253,1986. 307
15.Limited Communication and Incentive Compatibility(with J.GREEN),in Volume in Honor of L.Hurwicz,T.Groves,R.Radner,S.Reiter ed.,University of Minnesota Press,Ch.11,308-329,1987. 322
16.Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics(with E.MASKIN and J.C.ROCHET),in Information,Incentives, ＆ Economics Mechanisms,Volune in Honor of L.Hurwicz,T.Groves,R.Radner,S.Reiter ed.,University of Minnesota Press,Ch.8,256-266,1987 344
Part Ⅳ Collusion 355
17.On Coalititon Incentive Compatibility(with J.GREEN),Rewiew of Economic Studies,46:243-254,1979. 355
18.Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy,Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,6(2):301-324,1990. 367
19.The Politics of Government Decision-Making:A Theory of Regulatory Capture(with J.TIROLE),Quarterly Journal of Economics,106:1089-1127,1991. 391
20.Collusion under Asymmetric Information(with D.MARTIMORT),Econometrica,65(4):875-911,1997. 430
21.Reciprocal Supervision,Collusion,and Organizational Design(with Mathieu MELEU),Scandinavian Journal of Economics,99(4):519-540,1997. 467
22.Collusion and Delegation(with D.MARTIMORT),The RAND Journal of Economics,29(2):280-305,1998. 489
23.Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior(with D.MARTIMORT),The RAND Journal of Economics,30(2):232-262,1999. 515
24.Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation(with D.MARTIMORT),Econometrica,68(2):309-342,2000. 546
Part Ⅴ Incomplete Contracts 583
25.Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts(with J.GREEN),Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,25/26:123-150,1992. 583
26.Non Verifiability,Costly Renegotiation,and Efficiency(with J.GREEN),Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,36:82-95,1994. 611
Part Ⅵ Lack of Commitment 629
27.Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem(with J.GREEN),Econometrica,55(1):69-94,1987. 629
28.Implementation through Sequential Unanimity Games(with J.GREEN),in Cooperative Models in International Relations Research,M.Intrilligator and U.Luterbacher,Kluwer Academic Publishers,Boston,151-175,1994. 655
29.Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement(with J.TIROLE),Review of Economic Studies,57:597-625,1990. 680
30.The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts(with J.TIROLE),Econometrica,56:1153-1175,1988. 709
31.Comparative Statics of the Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract(with J.TIROLE),European Economic Review,31:901-926,1987. 732